Le bonheur; le bonheur est là, à notre portée. Il suffit de nous y mettre immédiatement! Audacieuse, étonnante, renversante, la philosophie de Robert Misrahi nous embarque. Elle est à lire par gros temps, elle agit comme un remontant. Cette pensée solaire est un élan, une force, un souffle qui nous réveille. Elle ravive la liberté, chante le Désir, célèbre la réflexion, matériaux essentiels à la construction de notre joie et de notre bonheur. Cette introduction à la philosophie misrahienne est une (...) invitation à ce beau voyage. Simple, didactique et pratique, elle donne envie de vagabonder, de sillonner, d'explorer et peu à peu d'aller vers le grand large, vers l'œuvre entière. Elle est destinée à tous. Cher lecteur, hâte-toi, hâte-toi donc d'embarquer pour la joie et le bonheur!"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Que peut-on attendre d'un « citoyen du monde » dans l'espace européen à venir? Que représente le cosmopolitisme en Europe? Voici quelques-unes des questions posées par cet ouvrage qui présente les réflexions de chercheurs européens et non européens sur le cosmopolitisme. Les regards des spécialistes sur la question sont variés et la réalité est analysée à partir de différentes disciplines. Ainsi, science politique, histoire, droit, langues, littérature et civilisation se conjuguent pour présenter une vision toujours évolutive, parfois idéale, du cosmopolitisme. (...) On considère souvent le cosmopolitisme comme obsolète. N'est-ce pas, au contraire, une des réponses possibles à la crise que traverse l'Union européenne en ce début de XXIe siècle? (shrink)

After having defined the KARO logic for specifying intelligent agents in earlier work we now turn to the question how to realise agents specified in the KARO framework. To this end we look at agent programming languages that we have defined, and investigate how programs in these languages can be linked to the KARO logic.

Albert and De Ruiter provide an introduction to the Conversation Analytic approach to ‘repair’: the ways in which people detect and deal with troubles in speaking, hearing and understanding in conversation. They explain the basic turn‐taking structures involved, provide examples, explain recent developments in the field and highlight some important points of contact and contrast with work in the Cognitive Sciences.

This article has two aims. The first is to introduce some novel data that highlight rather surprising pragmatic abilities in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The second is to consider a possible implication of these data for an emerging empirical methodology in philosophy of language and mind. In pursuing the first aim, we expect our main audience to be clinicians and linguists interested in pragmatics. It is when we turn to methodological issues that we hope to pique the interest of philosophers. (...) Still, the methodological issue becomes pressing precisely because of the empirical finding—thus the first part is important for the philosophical readers as well. The game plan is as follows. Given our intended dual audience, we begin with background on autism and pragmatics. Some of this material will be familiar to some of our readership, but few will know all of it. (Those who do are invited to skip these sections.) We then present some results from our pilot study on a corpus of speech by people with ASD. The heart of our finding is that certain speakers with ASD, who have severe trouble with familiar pragmatic phenomena such as metaphor and conversational implicature, exhibit surprising abilities with respect to what is often called “pragmatic determinants of what is said.” We turn next to a possible implication of this finding: It seems to suggest that hitherto seemingly promising evidence from ASD about the semantics/pragmatics boundary is.. (shrink)

Residency training in the Netherlands is to be restructured over the coming years. To this end a general competence profile for medical specialists has been introduced. This profile is nearly the same as the Canadian CanMEDS 2000 model, which describes seven general areas of medical specialist competence, one of which is professionalism. In order to establish a training programme for residents and their instructors based on this competence, it is necessary to develop a vision that does justice to everyday medical (...) practice. The two most prevailing views of professionalism—as personal, or as a behavioural characteristic—fall short of this. Only when professionalism is understood as reflective professionalism does it encompass the fundamental contextuality of medical treatment. This means that the focus of training and assessment must be shifted to accountability for treatment. (shrink)

The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends on high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved (...) in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research. (shrink)

L'axe principal de ce texte du philosophe polonais Emil Lask (1875-1915) est la critique de la philosophie de la valeur et la théorie de la connaissance. Son exposé est l'une des révisions du kantisme les plus radicales du début du XXe siècle.

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...) the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)